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Global poverty is higher on the public agenda than ever before.  While it has always been a 
central concern of development economists and professionals, it has never before been 
studied so intensively, and has never been as prominent in the public consciousness as it has 
become over the last few years.  This new focus is due in part to the commitment of the 
international community to the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)—
the first of which is to halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people living in 
extreme poverty.  It is due also to substantial progress in the collection and analysis of data.  
While we can now say much more about global poverty than in the past, considerable 
controversy has developed about how to analyze and interpret the data, and what they tell us 
about the magnitude and rate of change of global poverty.   
 
In many ways, the controversy should not come as a surprise.  If the world’s attention were 
not focused on poverty, we would have little need to measure it.  Differences among 
economists and statisticians in the estimates would be of little significance.  But with a global 
commitment to halve poverty, how we measure it makes a great deal of difference.  If in one 
system of metrics we have already achieved our goal, the MDGs will not be able to serve as 
the rallying cry for more assistance (whether of aid or trade).  At least some of the moral 
weight behind the demands by civil society is that the persistence of poverty at this level is 
unconscionable in a world of such wealth.   
 
The issue of measurement is thus of more than just academic interest.  What we measure 
affects what we do.  The focus on poverty has directed scarce resources towards poverty 
reduction.  Many of those who believe that we have made great strides in reducing poverty—
that we have already achieved the MDG of halving poverty since 1990—believe that these 
scarce resources should be devoted to maximizing growth.  Other critics of poverty 
measurement worry that focusing excessive attention on numbers in poverty encourages 
governments to direct resources towards those just below the poverty line as this is the easiest 
way to reduce the number of poor.  But this is not the best way to improve the well-being of 
the poor.   
 
All of the poverty lines used to measure global poverty represent living standards that are 
hard to fathom by those in advanced industrial countries.  What would it be like to live on $1 
a day, or $2 a day—on an annual income of $365 to $730?  For most of us, it is beyond 
conception.  The poverty standards in the US are closer to $15 a day, and a visit to the slums 
of Detroit or New York provides a picture of what life is like for those with incomes at this 
low level.  Having applied for a graduate fellowship very late in his 3rd year in college, and 
without a degree, MIT was generous enough to give Stiglitz a small fellowship which left 
him with just $1 a day for food (in 1963 prices—equivalent to $7 in today’s prices).  Even 
with careful planning, it was not sustainable: Stiglitz lost weight rapidly during the year 
(which he was happily able to regain subsequently).  For Stiglitz it was an experiment—one 
which he knew would end in 12 months.  But for those in the developing world, it is not an 
experiment, and for many no end to starvation-level diets is in sight.  There can be a vicious 
circle with poor diets leading to low productivity, and low productivity leading to low wages 
(see, for example, Stiglitz, 1976).   
 
Every once in a while, the neglected field of national income statistics finds itself at the 
center of controversy.  For example, the measurement of inflation in Argentina has been 
disputed in recent years: has the government cooked the books so that true inflation is higher 
than measured inflation?  Is it trying to allay the longstanding concerns of that society about 
inflation, not by lowering inflation, but by lowering the measurement of inflation?  Ten years 
ago, when Stiglitz served as Chair of the Council of Economic Advisers in the US, another 
such controversy flared up.  Were we overestimating inflation, thereby giving social security 
recipients (whose payments go up with inflation) far too much year after year, and 
undermining the financial viability of the entire social security system?  A report by a former 
Chair of the Council of Economic Advisers (Boskin Commission, 1996) found that inflation 
was overestimated by 1.3 percentage points per year from 1978 to 1996.   
 
In some cases, there is a strong rationale for measuring things one way or another.  In others, 
it is simply a matter of convention—though if we are to make comparisons across countries 
or over time, the comparisons must be done in a consistent way.  With products and prices 
changing all the time and differing across and within countries, making consistent 
comparisons is harder than it might seem, and some of the controversies relate to these 
differences.  With brie and croissants relatively more expensive in the US, and McDonalds 
hamburgers relatively more expensive in France, a Frenchman might find his cost of living in 
America (including his daily brie and croissants) far higher than in France; but at the same 
time, an American might find maintaining his life style in Paris more difficult than in 
America.  Economists have, over the years, developed standard, if imperfect, techniques for 
dealing with these problems.   
 
Even if there were not these price and product differences, there is another question.  How do 
we define poverty?  Some of the original poverty measures (“extreme poverty”) were devised 
as basic measures of survivability.  Below those levels, it was hard to sustain life—to meet 
nutritional needs and provide the basic necessities of shelter, energy for heating and cooking, 
and clothing.  Of course, these basic necessities could differ in different parts of the world—
illustrating that a global standard (e.g. $1 or $2 a day) must be viewed simply as an 
approximation, a point of reference.  It should be noted, though, that measured poverty 
corresponding to different poverty lines can show contrary trends depending on changes in 
the income distribution.  Moreover, updating the poverty line over time in a world of 
changing products and prices is a further source of controversy.   
 
Beyond national income statistics there are also serious issues regarding the household 
surveys that are used to measure living standards within countries.  Most data on the 
distribution of income come from asking people their income and consumption levels.  It is 
often difficult for individuals to recall this information perfectly.  We know that something is 
wrong because the total amount reported, when extrapolated to the whole economy, doesn’t 
add up to the total estimated income of the economy.  Is this due to conceptual differences 
between surveys and national accounts, or to underreporting in surveys?  If the latter, is the 
underreporting uniform, or are the rich underreporting more than the poor?  The answer to 
these questions, as we shall see, makes a great deal of difference to one’s view about what is 
happening to global poverty.   
 
This volume brings together some of the leading researchers in the field, from both academia 
and international organizations, in order to provide a thorough examination of the challenges 
and uncertainties involved in measuring global poverty.  The chapters in Part I of the book 
discuss questions on the measurement of poverty at a global level, including conceptual 
issues such as what we really mean by poverty, and whether we can apply the concept at the 
global level, to the highly practical questions of whether to use national accounts data or 
household survey data, and the difficulties posed by the use of purchasing power parity 
exchange rates.  Part II then presents chapters on specific regions of the world in order to 
provide an overview of the challenges faced in individual countries.   
 
Estimates of Global Poverty 
 
The standard estimates, most commonly cited by academics and the media, are due to 
Shaohua Chen and Martin Ravallion (2001, 2004, 2007, 2008) at the World Bank.  Using the 
World Bank’s ‘PPP[purchasing power parity]$1-a-day’ poverty line,1 Chen and Ravallion’s 
(2008) estimates are that 1,377 million people were living in extreme poverty in 2005, 
compared to 1,813 million in 1990 (see Table 0.1).2  Poverty is going down, but slowly.  At 
this pace, assuming a linear trend of decline would yield a total of 1,086 million poor in 2015.  
But performance varies widely across regions.  China has had enormous success in reducing 
poverty.  In Africa, however, the prospects of meeting the Millennium Development Goals 
are bleak, with poverty going up from 299 million in 1990 to 391 in 2005.   
 
The World Bank’s canonical estimates have been challenged by researchers from both the 
left and the right.  Some believe that the World Bank numbers underestimate the level of 
poverty and overestimate its reduction (see, in particular, the chapter by Sanjay Reddy and 
Thomas Pogge in this volume); while others (Surjit Bhalla in this volume, and Xavier Sala-i-
Martín 2006) believe that the World Bank numbers overestimate the level of poverty and 
underestimate its reduction.  Table 0.1 and Figure 0.1 present estimates of global poverty by 
Chen and Ravallion (2007, 2008), by Surjit Bhalla (2002, and this volume), and by Sala-i-
Martín (2006).  As can be seen, their estimates vary substantially.  Chen and Ravallion’s 
(2007) estimates are much lower than their (2008) estimates, but their rates of poverty decline 
are not very different.  Bhalla in his chapter, ostensibly using the same World Bank poverty 
line, estimates the number in extreme poverty to decline dramatically from 1,216 million in 
1990 to only 456 million in 2005.  Sala-i-Martín (2006) estimates global poverty at just 363 
million in 1990 and 322 million in 2000—a slower rate of decline, but from a much lower 
level.  In the context of trying to achieve the first MDG, our views on both the extent of 
global poverty and its rate of decline have great policy relevance.  Is a concerted international 
effort required?  Or is it true, as Sala-i-Martín claims, that “The world might just be in better 
shape than many of our leaders believe!”3   
 
The Measurement of Global Poverty 
 
The large divergence in estimates of global poverty arises from the use of different 
methodologies and datasets, which we now describe in greater detail.  First, the authors use 
different poverty lines.  Second, they use different PPP exchange rates to convert incomes in 
local currencies into a common international currency.4  Third, they take different approaches 
to estimating within-country distributions of income.  Fourth, they calculate mean incomes 
within countries differently.    
 
The Definition of Poverty 
 
The first question in the measurement of global poverty is: what do we mean by poverty?  Put 
another way, we have to define a poverty threshold.  The income poverty lines used by 
Bhalla, Sala-i-Martín, and the World Bank (i.e. Chen and Ravallion) are all derived, in some 
sense, from the original World Bank PPP$1-a-day poverty line at 1985 prices, used in World 
Bank (1990).  This poverty line was informally chosen as being representative of the poverty 
lines of the poorest countries, translated into 1985 PPP$, which represented basic subsistence 
in each of these countries.  Yet, while all authors base their poverty line on the same concept, 
they adopt different numbers.  Chen and Ravallion (2007) use PPP$1.08 at 1993 prices.  
Bhalla (2002) states that the “equivalent to $1 a day at 1985 prices is $1.30 a day at 1993 
prices and not $1.08 a day” (p. 67).  He thus uses a line of $1.30 at 1993 prices with survey 
data, while his “most preferred” method (p. 140) is to use national accounts data and adjust 
the poverty line to $1.50.5  In his chapter in this volume Bhalla uses the Chen and Ravallion 
(2007) line of $1.08 at 1993 prices.  Sala-i-Martín (2006) states that the poverty line of $1 a 
day at 1985 prices is equivalent to PPP$1.36 per day, or PPP$495 per year, at 1996 prices.  In 
their most recent update based on a new global price survey (discussed below), Chen and 
Ravallion (2008) adopt a line of PPP$1.25 at 2005 prices.  How can these differences be 
explained?   
 
The disagreement arises over how to update a 1985-based PPP$ value.  Within a single 
country, one would usually update a poverty line using a price index based on measured 
inflation.  Thus if prices are estimated to have risen by 10 percent after the poverty line was 
established, then the poverty line today should be 10 percent higher.  If we are expressing 
everything in US dollars, then all we need to do is to look at US inflation over the period 
1985 to 1993.  But updating a poverty line that is denominated in PPP$ is not so simple.  
Calculating a set of PPP exchange rates involves the prices of all countries (discussed below), 
so changes in a country’s PPP exchange rate will depend on price changes in all countries.  
Bangladesh’s 1985 poverty line in 1985 PPP$, scaled up by US inflation over 1985-1993, 
would not be expected to be equal to Bangladesh’s 1993 poverty line in 1993 PPP$.6   
 
This is part of the more general “index number problem” that there is no simple, or uniquely 
best, way to convert overall price levels across space or time when relative prices are 
changing—and relative prices do change, across both space and time.  PPPs are multilateral 
price indexes, and they have no analytical relationship with the price indexes used within 
countries to measure inflation.  In fact, Deaton (2001: 127) observes that “the PPP 
international dollar has strengthened relative to the currencies of the poor countries whose 
poverty lines are incorporated into the international line.”   
 
This is indeed what Chen and Ravallion (2001) find.  They calculate afresh a global poverty 
line for 1993 using a similar method to that for the original 1985 poverty line, deriving it as 
the median of the lowest ten poverty lines in their data set7 converted into PPP$—this time 
using 1993 PPPs.  This re-doing of the original method results in a poverty line of PPP$1.08 
per day of consumption in 1993 PPP dollars, referred to as ‘$1 a day’ for convenience.  This 
represents a much lower rate of inflation than experienced in the US over 1985-1993.  As 
Chen and Ravallion (2001: 288) point out, “the fact that $1.08 in 1993 has a US purchasing 
power less than $1 in 1985 does not mean that the real value of the poverty line has fallen.  
Indeed, if we had simply adjusted the $1 per day line for inflation in the US between 1985 
and 1993 we would have obtained a poverty line which is well above the median of the ten 
lowest poverty lines at 1993 PPP”.   
 
Sala-i-Martín (2006) appears to be unaware of this point, however, going so far as to claim 
that “this mysterious change in the poverty threshold has never been explained by the World 
Bank” (p. 370).  Instead, he bases his calculation of a poverty line on US inflation, stating 
(pp. 370, 372) that the 1985 poverty line corresponds to $495 a year in 1996 prices.  Bhalla 
(2002: 64-7) maintains that “international inflation … is what is needed to convert incomes 
(or consumption) from one base to another” (p. 65).  Unfortunately, this ignores Deaton’s 
point regarding the depreciation of the currencies of poor countries relative to international 
PPP$.  For these reasons the poverty lines used by Bhalla (2002) and by Sala-i-Martín (2006) 
are higher in real terms than those used by the World Bank.8   
 
All three of these methods of constructing a global poverty line use a money metric threshold 
of poverty, converting estimates of household consumption, measured in national currency 
units, into PPP$.  Reddy and Pogge in this volume challenge the money metric approach to 
global poverty measurement.  Their primary objection to the PPP$1-a-day poverty line is that 
it does not correspond to any “achievement concept” or set of capabilities that are common 
across countries.  That is, there is no reason to think that PPP$1 a day in one country will 
enable the same set of achievements—e.g. in terms of nutrition or shelter—as PPP$1 a day in 
another country.  While domestic poverty lines are often set according to some achievement 
concept, this interpretation is lost when a global poverty line is constructed using standard 
PPP exchange rates.  Reddy and Pogge argue that an explicit achievement-based threshold 
should be used to define a global poverty line.  This would require costing the minimal 
standard set of capabilities in each country to yield a money-metric poverty line denominated 
in local currency.  Thus the global capability-based poverty threshold would be represented in 
income space by the set of these national poverty lines, one for each country.9   
 
T. N. Srinivasan in his chapter is equally critical of the World Bank’s definition of a global 
poverty line.  He argues that poverty should be seen as a multidimensional concept, but that if 
it is to be considered in monetary terms it should be defined at the national level only—as the 
cost of a bundle of basic goods and services specific to each country.  He is more pessimistic 
than Reddy and Pogge regarding the possibility of defining a global poverty line for 
international comparison and aggregation across countries.  In his view, measures of global 
poverty will in practice never be satisfactory and are at best just advocacy tools for focusing 
public attention.   
 
Robert Johnston’s chapter contributes a historical discussion on the measurement of poverty, 
tracing it back over more than a century.  He argues that the concept of extreme poverty as 
“distress and degradation” developed by early researchers remains appropriate for the 
measurement of global poverty today.   
 
David E. Sahn and Stephen D. Younger’s chapter on Africa in this volume follows the 
achievements-based approach of the human development literature by focusing on non-
monetary measures of poverty.  As indicators of well-being they use anthropometric 
measures (height-for-age and body mass index) and years of schooling.  The authors make 
the point that these non-income indicators have a number of practical advantages over 
monetary indicators, including their being easier to measure reliably,10 and their being 
defined at the individual rather than the household level.  To these one could add Reddy and 
Pogge’s point that they do not suffer from the difficulties of the PPP$1-a-day line, and are 
thus more comparable across countries.  On the other hand, since these measures depend on 
nutrition and health, or schooling, over a number of years, they are measures of a longer-term 
conception of well-being than those based on current real income or consumption.  Thus they 
are unlikely to respond to short-run changes in policy or economic environment.  Sahn and 
Younger’s data on Africa indicate a mixed picture: no clear trend in health indicators, but a 
widespread (though not ubiquitous) decline in education poverty.   
 
Sakiko Fukuda-Parr and David Stewart in their chapter similarly provide a multidimensional 
picture of poverty and development, presenting a broad overview of recent trends in human 
poverty and human development.  Using such wide-ranging indicators as life expectancy and 
rates of hunger and schooling, in addition to income, they illustrate the point that a full 
picture requires the use of numerous measures of well-being.   
 
While the above authors use non-monetary measures of deprivation, Riskin and Gao in their 
chapter on China consider several income poverty lines that are based on the cost of 
achieving minimum levels of calorie intake.  They find that the direction of change of urban 
poverty between 1988 and 1995 depends on the poverty line used, but there appears to have 
been a clear decline from 1995 to 2002.  The social safety nets put in place by the 
government do not seem to be behind this reduction, but the government’s strategy to make 
growth more equitable, including its targeted investment programs, may have played a role.  
Riskin and Gao also analyze a range of factors associated with urban poverty and find, for 
instance, that while employment in a state-owned enterprise reduced the probability of being 
poor in 1988, it increased the probability in 1995 and had no impact in 2002.  While being 
unemployed contributes substantially to the probability of being poor, most heads of poor 
urban households are in fact employed.   
 
Purchasing Power Parity Exchange Rates 
 
Assuming one adopts the money-metric approach to poverty measurement, household 
consumption in national currencies has to be converted into a common currency for 
international comparison.  The use of PPP exchange rates is intended to take account of the 
fact that, for instance, a dollar’s worth of rupees, bought on the currency markets, will buy 
more of most goods and services in India than the same dollar would buy in the US.  Thus $1 
converted into rupees at the PPP exchange rate should buy approximately the same quantity 
of goods and services in India as $1 does in the US.  Incomes in developing countries can be 
three or four times higher when measured at PPP exchange rates than when measured at 
market exchange rates.   
 
PPP exchange rates are calculated using price surveys across countries conducted by the 
International Comparison Program (ICP).  But these surveys are not done every year, so the 
country’s real growth rate (measured using its own market basket of goods to adjust for 
inflation) is used to estimate PPP income in other years.  However, when we calculate real 
PPP income in this way estimates can turn out to be very different from estimates based on a 
new price survey (for instance, see World Bank, 2008b).11  Thus estimates of real income 
using PPPs based on different benchmark years will not be comparable.   
 
ICP price surveys were benchmarked in 1985, 1993-1996 (referred to as the 1993 ICP), and 
2005.  Apart from the latest World Bank estimates (Chen and Ravallion, 2008) which are 
based on the 2005 ICP, all estimates of global poverty in Table 0.1 use PPPs based on the 
1993 ICP.  Other researchers have not yet used the 2005 ICP data to generate estimates of 
global poverty.  One advantage of the new ICP round is that, for the first time, a price survey 
has been undertaken for China—its PPP exchange rate had previously been estimated on the 
basis of a regression equation.  It is also the first time since 1985 that an ICP price survey has 
been conducted for India.  For both countries, the estimates of GDP using the new PPP 
exchange rates are substantially lower than previous estimates (World Bank, 2008b).  Chen 
and Ravallion’s chapter in this volume discusses the implications of the new price data for 
China and presents new poverty estimates.  China is found to have more poverty than 
previously thought, but its record in poverty reduction remains just as impressive.  This is 
not, of course, surprising: the new PPP data indicate that income levels in China are lower 
than implied by previous PPP estimates, but estimates of growth rates are unchanged.   
 
The most widely used set of PPP data are from the Penn World Tables (PWT), and Bettina 
Aten and Alan Heston in their chapter discuss the use of PWT data in the measurement of 
global poverty.  The PWT PPP estimates are based on the Geary-Khamis (GK) method, in 
which a vector of ‘average international prices’ is constructed to value the output of each 
country.  Both Bhalla and Sala-i-Martín make use of PWT in their estimation of global 
poverty.12  On the other hand, the World Bank, for both its GDP and global poverty 
estimates, uses the Eltetö-Köves-Szulc (EKS) method.  This method does not involve 
constructing a vector of international prices but is based on bilateral (Fisher) price indices 
computed using each country’s output vector as weights; the PPP exchange rate for a given 
country is then defined as the geometric average of its bilateral price indices with respect to 
all other countries.13   
 
The use by the GK method of a vector of “average international prices” leads to a potential 
problem.  As Aten and Heston explain, the “international price” of a good is a weighted 
average of its price in international dollars in each country, where the weights are the 
country’s share in world output.  This implies that prices in larger economies get a larger 
weight, so the resulting relative international prices are closer to relative prices in larger 
economies, which tend to be richer per capita.  When incomes are measured at these 
international prices, substitution bias (the Gershenkron effect)—the fact that people buy more 
of the goods that are relatively cheap in their own country—implies that the incomes of poor 
countries are likely to be overestimated relative to the incomes of rich countries.  Since the 
global poverty line is the median of the lowest ten poverty lines at EKS PPP$ (Chen and 
Ravallion, 2001), calculating global poverty relative to this line through use of incomes 
converted at GK PPP will lead to an underestimate.14  Using the same basic methodology as 
Sala-i-Martín, a study by Robert Ackland, Steve Dowrick and Benoit Freyens (2004) finds 
that estimates based on incomes at EKS PPP imply a global poverty incidence nearly 60 
percent higher than those based on incomes at GK PPP (from PWT).  In published global 
poverty estimates Sala-i-Martín (2006) is alone in making exclusive use of PWT GDP data 
(based on GK PPPs),15 and this is likely to be part of the explanation for his much lower 
estimates of global poverty compared with the World Bank’s EKS-based estimates.   
 
Aten and Heston discuss the possibility of “poverty PPPs”, or PPP exchange rates designed 
specifically to convert the incomes of the poor.  They observe that existing consumption 
PPPs, based on prices only of consumption goods and services, are an improvement on GDP 
PPPs, which include investment goods and government expenditures.  But, as they point out, 
the consumption basket of the poor will typically be different from the average consumption 
basket, with food expenditure comprising a larger fraction of the budget of the poor than of 
the average consumer.  The poor may also face different prices from the average consumer.  
In principle one could restrict PPP calculations to goods consumed by the poor, and also use 
prices faced by the poor, but such data are typically not available.16  These questions 
regarding the appropriate expenditure weights and prices in the construction of poverty PPPs 
apply to both the GK and EKS methods.   
 
The fact that standard PPPs are not designed for converting the incomes of the poor is also 
highlighted by Reddy and Pogge.  They observe that use of these PPPs implies that estimates 
of global poverty depend on some prices that are irrelevant to the poor.  They comment that 
“whether a household in India lives in absolute poverty by the $1 PPP per day standard 
cannot reasonably depend on information about Japanese real estate prices, but under the 
current methodology of poverty assessment it may.”17  The use of poverty PPPs would 
mitigate this problem.   
 
The Distribution of Income within Countries 
 
For measuring global poverty we need an estimate of the distribution of income within each 
country.  Household income or consumption surveys in countries are the main source for this 
information.  Access by the World Bank to the primary unit-record data in such surveys 
enables it to compute a country’s income or consumption distribution directly (for 
convenience, henceforth referred to simply as ‘income distribution’).18  Other authors who 
did not have access to unit-record data of household surveys have used secondary published 
information on within-country inequality.   
 
Bhalla (2002) thus uses a two-step method to estimate global poverty.  First, he takes 
estimates of relative inequality within countries from secondary datasets (Deininger and 
Squire, 1996, and WIDER’s World Income Inequality Database), which provide quintile 
shares for most countries and decile shares for some.  For each country he scales these 
income shares to an exogenous estimate of average income or consumption.19  His favored 
method in Bhalla (2002) is to scale to a constant fraction of the national accounts category of 
per capita Household Final Consumption Expenditure (HFCE),20 but he also provides 
estimates where income shares are scaled to the mean income as measured in surveys.  In his 
chapter in this volume he presents three sets of estimates.  Two estimates are based on survey 
means from different sources (World Bank, and non-World Bank website data, respectively).  
The third method, which he favors, uses the survey mean in 1987 and projects this mean 
backwards and forwards using the growth rate of consumption from the national accounts, 
thus keeping constant the ratio of the mean of the distribution to HFCE at its 1987 value; he 
refers to this method as SNAk (estimates reported in our Table 0.1 and Figure 0.1).  Sala-i-
Martín also follows a two-step method, taking quintile share data from Deininger and Squire 
(1996 updated dataset) and scaling them to per capita GDP.  The quintile shares are then 
converted to smoothed within-country distributions using a technique called kernel density 
estimation.21   
 
Perhaps the most important methodological difference between the estimates of global 
poverty is the choice of mean for within-country distributions: the survey mean itself, 
(adjusted) per capita HFCE, or per capita GDP.  This choice would seem to account for much 
of the difference in estimates of levels of and changes in global poverty.   
 
Both Bhalla and Sala-i-Martín scale within-country distributions to national accounts 
categories: adjusted per capita HFCE and per capita GDP, respectively.  One reason given by 
Sala-i-Martín for scaling to per capita GDP is that he wishes to measure income and not 
consumption poverty.  This, however, would require the use of a national accounts category 
of aggregate personal or household income.  But following the 1993 System of National 
Accounts, most countries do not include such a category in their published national accounts.  
GDP is therefore the only national accounts measure of income available across a wide range 
of countries.  However, its use in the measurement of poverty is problematic.  GDP includes 
retained earnings of corporations, the part of government revenue (taxes) that is not 
distributed back to households as cash transfers, and does not net out depreciation.  For 
illustration we can take the example of the US, which is one of the few countries that does 
report measures of household income (referred to as personal income) in its National Income 
and Product Accounts (NIPA).  In 2006, US GDP was $13,246.6 billion, personal income 
$10,891.2 billion, and disposable personal income $9,529.1 billion (NIPA tables 1.1.5 and 
2.1).  Disposable personal income was therefore only 72 percent of GDP.22  Hence scaling to 
GDP per capita can substantially overestimate personal incomes and underestimate income 
poverty.   
 
The Millennium Development Goals  monitor consumption poverty,23 which is what the 
World Bank attempts to estimate.  Ravallion (2004) argues that the difference between 
consumption and income poverty (and Sala-i-Martín’s use of GDP to measure income) may 
account for the difference between Sala-i-Martín’s and the World Bank’s 1993 PPP$-based 
estimates (reported in Chen and Ravallion, 2007).   
 
The category of HFCE excludes those components of GDP that are excluded from any 
measure of aggregate household or personal income, and HFCE is reported for all countries 
in the IMF’s International Financial Statistics.  Thus Bhalla’s (2002) (adjusted) HFCE-based 
global poverty estimates are higher than Sala-i-Martín’s estimates and closer to the World 
Bank’s (see Figure 0.1 and Table 0.1), reflecting this.  However, Bhalla’s estimates (SNAk) 
in this volume based on the growth rate of HFCE decline more rapidly than his or the World 
Bank’s (1993 PPP$) survey mean-based estimates, and by 2001 have fallen to approximately 
half of the World Bank’s estimates.   
 
The divergence between survey mean-based and HFCE-based estimates of global poverty is 
due to a growing divergence between survey means and per capita HFCE.  Deaton in his 
chapter finds that, for his sample of non-OECD countries during 1990-2000, “the growth rate 
of survey consumption is approximately half of the growth rate of national accounts 
consumption”.  In India, for example, the ratio of survey to NA (National Accounts) 
consumption declined over time from 0.68 in 1983 to 0.56 in 1999/2000.  There has been 
heated debate on the source of this divergence in the context of poverty measurement in India 
(e.g. Ravallion, 2000; Bhalla, 2002; Deaton and Kozel, 2005).   
 
Although both surveys and the national accounts measure ‘household consumption’, 
household expenditure in surveys differs from HFCE in the national accounts in both concept 
and method of estimation.  This issue is discussed in detail by Ivo Havinga, Gisèle Kamanou 
and Viet Vu in their chapter.  In terms of concept, HFCE includes imputed values of financial 
intermediation services and consumption by ‘non-profit organizations serving households’.24  
HFCE also includes imputed rents from owner-occupied housing, which are often not 
estimated in household surveys.  It should be noted that neither survey expenditure nor HFCE 
includes imputed values of government-provided healthcare, education or other services.25   
 
The two categories also differ greatly in their method of estimation.26  To calculate HFCE the 
national accounts typically starts with an estimate of national production of a commodity 
such as rice from crop-cutting data, aerial or farm surveys, etc.  As such surveys are 
conducted infrequently, gross production figures may have to be estimated without up-to-date 
information.  Moreover, the methods used to arrive at these figures are not applied uniformly 
and can be unreliable.  From an estimate of national production thus generated, government 
consumption and firms’ consumption are subtracted, and the residual is attributed to 
households.  Data on government consumption may be adequate, but firms’ consumption is 
typically poorly estimated.  It is often based on outdated firm surveys and extrapolations, or 
assumed changes over time.  In India, the divergence between survey and national accounts 
consumption is partly due to the underestimation by NA of firms’ consumption of 
intermediate goods.  This has led to double-counting where, for instance, the edible oil 
consumed in restaurant meals was attributed to HFCE under both the ‘edible oil’ category 
and the ‘restaurant meals’ category.27   
 
NA estimates of HFCE are thus indirect and subject to three sources of error: the initial 
estimate of aggregate production, the estimate of government consumption, and the estimate 
of firms’ consumption.  There is no reason to suppose that the data and methods used to 
estimate these, which include surveys of various types, are more reliable than household 
surveys.  Moreover, their sources and methods are generally less well-documented (in terms 
of the surveys employed, how and when they were conducted, etc.) than household surveys.  
Finally, because it is calculated as a residual, the errors in the estimate of HFCE will tend to 
get compounded.  By contrast, household surveys measure personal consumption and income 
directly.   
 
Household income and consumption measured through surveys will, however, also be subject 
to errors.  One reason is that there may be underreporting of incomes.  If all incomes were 
underreported by the same fraction, then uniform scaling to an accurate estimate of mean 
income would correct the problem.  However, the underreporting is not uniform across the 
distribution.  As Ravallion (this volume) discusses, the rich tend to underreport 
proportionately more than the poor.   
 
Differential underreporting by the rich and poor can help to explain the growing divergence 
between mean income or consumption measured in surveys and in the national accounts.  As 
the income share of the rich rises, which has occurred for instance in both India and China 
(and in other countries where inequality has risen), greater underreporting by the rich 
compared with the poor will imply growing underestimation of average household income 
and consumption as measured in surveys.   
 
Underreporting by the rich will not by itself imply any bias in the measurement of poverty 
when individual income or consumption levels are obtained directly from surveys.  In this 
case, individuals above the poverty line are of limited interest, and scaling to national 
accounts categories can lead to underestimation of the incidence of poverty.  In his chapter, 
Ravallion provides a simple illustration of this point.   
 
The true but unobserved distribution of income is (say) 1, 2, 3 (person 1 has an income of 1, 
person 2 has income 2, person 3 has 3).  The poverty line is slightly above 1, so the true 
poverty rate is 1/3.  We do a survey, and the three people respond that their incomes are 1, 
1.5 and 2.  Income of person 2 is underestimated by one quarter, while it is underestimated by 
one-third for person 3.  The survey gives the right poverty rate.  However, the survey 
underestimates the true mean; the survey mean is 1.5.  Now let’s assume (for the sake of 
argument) that the national accounts do give the right mean of 2.  If we assume that the 
survey under-estimation is distribution-neutral then we multiply all three incomes by 4/3.  
The ‘corrected’ incomes are 1.3, 2 and 2.7—implying that there is no poverty.  We get the 
mean right, but the poverty measure is way off the mark.   
 
Moreover, if a rise in within-country inequality leads to a growing underestimation of the 
mean, then the extent of underestimation of poverty due to scaling to the NA mean may be 
increasing over time—which will imply an overestimation of poverty reduction.   
 
A further problem with household surveys is that the respondents may not be representative 
of the population.  The very rich are reluctant to respond for tax and other reasons.  Korinek 
et al. (2006) find that in the US the rich tend to respond less than the poor.  In poor countries, 
on the other hand, the very poor and marginalized—particularly the homeless who have no 
fixed address, or those living in remote rural areas—may be excluded from the sample frame 
and are thus also likely to be under-represented.   
 
The implication of under-representation of both the rich and the poor in surveys is different 
from that of underreporting.  In this context even data taken directly from the survey may 
underestimate poverty.  Extending Ravallion’s example, suppose that the true distribution is 
1, 1, 2, 3, 3, and hence the true poverty rate is 2/5.  Now suppose that half of the poorest are 
missed from the sample frame and half of the richest fail to respond, so the survey reports 
only the three incomes 1, 2, 3.  The survey mean remains correct at 2, but the survey 
underestimates poverty at 1/3 when the true incidence is 2/5.   
 
Even though surveys are prone to measurement error, there is little reason to think that 
scaling the mean to some NA category, while using within-country relative distributions from 
surveys, will reduce the error in measuring poverty.  On the other hand it is doubtful that the 
decline in survey means relative to NA means could be attributed entirely to underreporting 
by the rich.  Bhalla’s method of using the survey mean in 1987, and projecting this mean 
forwards and backwards with the growth rate of NA consumption, provides a useful 
alternative for comparison with the purely survey-based estimates of the World Bank.  As 
seen above, his estimates indicate a more rapid rate of poverty reduction after 1987 than the 
World Bank’s, owing to the growing divergence between survey and NA means.   
 
Clearly there is scope to improve data collection in household surveys.  Albert Berry, in his 
chapter on the measurement of poverty in Latin America, describes the difficulties in 
measuring several components of household income including production for own 
consumption at the lower end of the distribution, and capital income at the upper end of the 
distribution.  Data collection is improving over time, but he believes that confidence intervals 
around estimates of the Gini coefficient should be of the order of 4 or 5 percentage points.  
These limitations in the data, he argues, make it hard to determine the impact the policy 
reforms that have taken place in Latin America have had on poverty.  K. Sundaram and 
Suresh Tendulkar in their chapter discuss further problems in the collection of household 
survey data in India, including reference periods that have changed, and their implications for 
estimates of poverty.  On the basis of a close analysis of the survey data they conclude that, 
despite numerous sources of non-comparability between the surveys over time, the finding of 
declining poverty in India in the 1990s is robust.   
 
Data Coverage and Comparability 
 
As we have seen, all estimates of global poverty rely on household surveys to provide income 
or consumption distributions within countries.  But while the availability of survey data has 
improved substantially in recent years, the coverage of countries remains a problem.  In 
particular, the coverage of countries in sub-Saharan Africa is a major concern.   
 
Chen and Ravallion’s (2008) poverty estimates for the World Bank are based on 675 surveys 
across 116 countries.  Ninety percent of the population of the developing world is represented 
by a survey within two years of 2005 (Chen and Ravallion, 2008: 13-6).  But this includes 
only 71 percent of the population of sub-Saharan Africa.  Moreover, coverage for this region 
is very low in the 1980s, and Chen and Ravallion (2008: 16) report that “our estimates for the 
early 1980s rely heavily on projections based on distributions around 1990”.  Sahn and 
Younger in their chapter argue that the World Bank’s reported figures for consumption 
poverty are somewhat implausible for a number of African countries, and are likely to reflect 
the difficulties of collecting expenditure data.  Chen and Ravallion (2008: 16, fn 33) also note 
that their survey data for China in the early 1980s “are probably less reliable than later 
years”.  The lack of good quality data will contribute to uncertainty in estimates of global 
poverty.28   
 
In addition to coverage there is also the question of data comparability.29  In some country 
surveys incomes are gross-of-tax and in others net-of-tax; for some they refer to cash incomes 
and for others certain items of income-in-kind are included.  The rental value of owner-
occupied housing is imputed in some surveys but not in others.  In studies that use secondary 
data for within-country distributions, different distributions may have different population 
units—individuals or households (sometimes families)—and these units may be ranked in a 
variety of ways, e.g. individuals ranked by income received, individuals ranked by household 
income per capita (or per equivalent adult), households ranked by household income per 
capita (or per equivalent adult), households ranked by total household income.  The 
population unit and ranking concept used to construct the distribution can make a huge 
difference to measured inequality and poverty.  For example, Anand (1983) found that the 
income share of the lowest 40 percent varied from 9.6 percent to 17.7 percent for differently-
defined distributions of income from the same Malaysian household survey.  Chen and 
Ravallion, on the other hand, use unit-record data from household surveys in each country to 
construct distributions of individuals ranked by per capita household income (or 
consumption). 
 The data comparability issue was discussed at length by Atkinson and Brandolini (2001) in 
their review of secondary datasets used in studies of income inequality.  On the basis of a 
detailed analysis of distribution data for Organsation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) countries they find that problems of comparability, including those 
described above, are present even in the “high quality” subset of the Deininger and Squire 
(1996) compilation, used by both Bhalla (2002 and this volume) and Sala-i-Martín (2006).  
Atkinson and Brandolini (2001: 777-8) conclude that “users could be seriously misled if they 
simply download the Deininger and Squire ‘accept’ series [i.e. the ‘high quality’ subset]”.  
Recent World Bank distributional data, described in Chen and Ravallion (2004, 2008), are 
subject to fewer problems of non-comparability than Deininger and Squire (1996) but some 
problems remain, such as the unavoidable mixing of income and consumption distributions.   
 
The coverage of PPP data based on the 1993 ICP has also been a significant concern.  In the 
World Bank’s previous global poverty estimates (Chen and Ravallion, 2007), the PPPs for 69 
of the 100 countries were based on data collected in the 1993 ICP, while most of the 
remainder were based on interpolations from cross-country regressions.  China and India 
were important exceptions: India’s PPP was extrapolated from its 1985 estimate, while 
China’s was “based on a credible independent (non-ICP) study of price levels in 10 cities of 
China” (Chen and Ravallion, 2004: 9).  As we saw earlier, the 2005 ICP has much wider 
coverage than the 1993 ICP and includes data for both China and India.  The improved 
coverage has made a substantial difference to estimates of global poverty, which is due in 
part to the finding that both China and India are approximately 40 percent poorer than 




The international community’s commitment to halve global poverty by 2015 has been 
enshrined in the first Millennium Development Goal.  How global poverty is measured is a 
critical element in assessing progress towards this goal.  The chapters in this volume address 
a range of problems in the estimation of global poverty, from a variety of viewpoints.  Given 
their political salience, it is not surprising that controversy surrounds both ‘official’ and 
independent estimates, and that a lively debate has ensued.   
 
In this Introduction, we have discussed different views concerning the possibility of defining 
and using a meaningful global poverty line.  We have examined different PPP exchange rates 
that have been used to map a global poverty line across countries, and the complications that 
arise in the periodic re-estimation of PPPs on the basis of different ICPs.  One of the most 
significant differences between the studies is whether they use survey or national accounts 
means for within-country distributions in the estimation of global poverty.  It will be clear 
from our discussion of the issues that we have reservations about some of the approaches 
adopted.  We have nonetheless tried to include the full range of viewpoints to allow the 
reader to form his or her own judgment about their relative merits.  The debate on the 
measurement of global poverty will surely continue, and with this volume we hope to 





                                                                                                                                                        
 
1  As we discuss below, the original ‘PPP$1-a-day’ poverty line has been updated to 
PPP$1.25 at 2005 prices.   
2  Chen and Ravallion (2008: Table 8).   
3  Sala-i-Martín (2006: 392).   
4  PPP exchange rates convert, say, pounds into dollars, not at the official exchange rate but 
at a rate reflecting the differences in purchasing power.  The official exchange rate may 
be US$1.50 to UK£1, but one can buy about the same market basket of goods with a 
pound in the UK as with a dollar in the US.  Hence the PPP exchange rate would be 1 to 
1, not 1.5 to 1.  (Not surprisingly, different patterns of consumption will give rise to 
different PPP exchange rates.)   
5  Bhalla (2002) states that “the errors inherent in [National Accounts] means are corrected 
by increasing the poverty line by approximately 15 percent, from $1.30 per capita per day 
to $1.50 per capita per day” (p. 121).  We discuss the use of National Accounts means 
below.   
6  More generally, GDP at PPP$ calculated in year t+n is not equal to GDP at PPP$ 
calculated in year t multiplied by intervening domestic growth and deflated by 
intervening US inflation.   
7  The ten countries are Bangladesh, China, India, Indonesia, Nepal, Pakistan, Tanzania, 
Thailand, Tunisia, and Zambia (Chen and Ravallion 2001: 285).   
8  While Bhalla (2002) and Sala-i-Martín (2006) both use a higher real poverty line than 
Chen and Ravallion (2007), Sala-i-Martín’s estimates of poverty are lower in all years 
and Bhalla’s (2002) are lower from about 1990.  This is due to other methodological 
differences, such as their use of National Accounts data for scaling household incomes, 
which we discuss later.   
                                                                                                                                                        
 
9  One could then use the relative cost of this capability set in different countries to infer the 
implied ‘PPP’ exchange rates.  There is no reason to think that such exchange rates would 
be similar to extant PPP exchange rates.   
10  Although it is possible to measure years of schooling reliably, a year of schooling in one 
country may differ from that in another in quality or in total hours spent at school. 
11  Given a benchmark year t, GDP in PPP$ in year t+n is calculated by scaling GDP in 
PPP$ in year t up or down by the country’s real growth rate (nominal growth minus a 
price deflator).  In the case of Penn World Tables there is a further stage of reconciliation 
after this updating (Aten and Heston, this volume).  GDP in PPP$ in year t+n calculated 
in this manner can be very different from that obtained by use of an ICP conducted in 
base year t+n.   
12  In the case of Bhalla (2002), PWT is only one of several cited sources.  However, 
Bhalla’s use of multiple PPP sources is idiosyncratic and difficult to defend (see Anand 
and Segal 2008: 81-2).   
13  See Anand and Segal (2008: 70-3) for formulas and discussion of the GK and EKS 
methods.   
14  Of course, if the global poverty line itself were re-estimated as the median of the lowest 
ten poverty lines in GK PPP$, then the overestimation of incomes in poor countries 
would also lead to a higher poverty line in GK PPP$, and such a bias would not be 
present.   
15  Bhalla (2002) mixes PPP sources, which is problematic for a different reason.  Thus on p. 
140 he reports using the World Bank’s World Development Indicators as his source for 
PPPs, but on p. 207 he reports using PPPs additionally from the Penn World Tables, the 
IMF’s International Financial Statistics, and Maddison (2001), benchmarked in various 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
years.  The PPPs in these sources are inconsistent because some are based on EKS and 
others on GK, and they are benchmarked to different years (Anand and Segal 2008: 81-2).   
16  It would also require knowing “the poor” in advance, implying a certain circularity.  
However, this is not a major practical problem.   
17  By itself, of course, this does not tell us whether global poverty is under- or over-
estimated.   
18  All estimates of global poverty are based on datasets that include both income and 
consumption surveys.  The World Bank, wherever possible, chooses consumption surveys 
over income surveys.  Mixing income and consumption surveys raises questions of 
comparability, which are discussed in Anand and Segal (2008: 73-4).   
19  Bhalla (2002) also smoothes within-country distributions by fitting a three-parameter 
Lorenz curve to the quintile shares through regression.  After this regression he performs 
a “filtering” procedure (pp. 133-4), but it is unclear precisely what this procedure 
involves (Anand and Segal 2008: 81).   
20  Bhalla (2002: 128) scales to 0.867 times HFCE.   
21  The smoothing technique used by Sala-i-Martín (2006) is problematic (see Anand and 
Segal 2008: 78-9).  First, the theory of kernel density estimation assumes that the income 
observations are independent identically-distributed draws from the underlying income 
distribution, which is not the case for quintile means.  Secondly, his use of a constant 
bandwidth across all countries’ datasets is incorrect because the appropriate bandwidth 
for a distribution depends on its spread.  Minoiu and Reddy (2008) find that the use of 
alternative bandwidths makes a large difference to poverty estimates.  Finally, non-
parametric kernel density estimation is intended for large datasets, whereas each of Sala-
                                                                                                                                                        
i-Martín’s country distributions is constructed from just five data points (the quintile 
means).   
22  Anand and Segal (2008: 67).   
23  This is, however, somewhat ambiguous.  The “Official List of MDG Indicators” on the 
Millennium Development Goals Indicators website [http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/] states 
the reduction of income poverty as the goal, whereas under “Data Availability” the data 
used to monitor this goal are described as measuring consumption poverty.   
24  The latter includes expenditure by organizations such as political parties and religious 
associations.   
25  Aten and Heston in their chapter state that the latest PWT, version 6.1, includes 
expenditures on health and education by government and non-profit institutions in 
“Household Actual Final Consumption” for OECD countries, but not for other countries.   
26  Much of this paragraph closely follows Deaton (2003: 367-8).   
27  See Kulshreshtha and Kar (2005).   
28  The coverage and quality of data in Bhalla (2002) is unclear.  According to his Table A.1 
(p. 209) there are 317 surveys for the period 1950-1980, and 604 for the period 1980-
2000, implying a total of 921.  But he also reports using “more than 1,000 household 
surveys” (p. 38).  Ravallion (2002: 8) observes that only “[a]bout half of Bhalla’s 600 
distributions over 1980-2000 would pass the quality standards applied to the [World] 
Bank’s calculations”.   
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 Figure 0.1: Estimates of Global Poverty 1980-2005, millions 
 
Table 0.1: Estimates of Global Poverty 1980-2005, millions 
 
Year 1980 1990 2000 2005 
Chen and Ravallion (2008) 
PPP$1.25, 2005 prices 
1,896a 1,813 1,696b 1,377 
Chen and Ravallion (2007) 
PPP$1.08, 1993 prices 
1,470a 1,248 1,109b 969d 
Bhalla (this volume) SNAk  
PPP$1.08, 1993 prices 
1,489a 1,216 770c 456 
Bhalla (2002) adjusted HFCE 
PPP$1.50, 1993 prices 
1,479 1,056 647  
Bhalla (2002) survey means 
PPP$1.30, 1993 prices 
1,581 1,208 899  
Sala-i-Martin (2006) 
PPP$1.36, 1996 prices 
498 363 322  
 
